We examine the mapping of the distribution of ability onto earnings in a hierarchical job assignment model. Workers are assigned to a continuum of jobs in fixed proportions, ordered by sensitivity to ability. The model implies a novel marginal productivity interpretation of wages. We derive comparative statics for changes in technology and in the distribution of ability. We find conditions under which a more unequal distribution of ability maps onto a more/less unequal distribution of earnings. We also analyze an assignment model with variable proportions and find that in the Cobb-Douglas case, a rise in ability inequality always narrows the range of earnings.
Using a simple model with two levels of skill, we assume that high skill workers who fail to get hig...
An ordered-response model for the allocation of individuals to jobs differing in degree of difficult...
We propose an assignment model in which positions along a hierarchy are attributed to individuals de...
This paper reviews the literature on two-sided atomeless assign-ment models of workers to tasks. Usi...
Several empirical regularities motivate most theories of the distribution of labor earnings. Earning...
We analyze a model in which workers must be allocated to tasks to produce. There are differences amo...
This paper exploits empirically a key insight from Lucas (1977) and Rosen (1982): that the organizat...
Some pieces of empirical evidence suggest that in the U.S., over the last few decades, (i) wage ineq...
This paper demonstrates the way in which assignment frictions-the limited ability of workers to find...
International audienceWe propose an assignment model in which positions along a hierarchy are attrib...
This paper shows that without substitution of skills and without adjustments of individ ual wages ch...
The distributions of firm size, span of control, and managerial incomes are modeled as the joint out...
[[abstract]]We develop a wage determination model in which a firm decides the pattern of compensatio...
This paper exploits empirically a key insight from Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982): that the organizat...
A central organizing framework of the voluminous recent literature studying changes in the returns t...
Using a simple model with two levels of skill, we assume that high skill workers who fail to get hig...
An ordered-response model for the allocation of individuals to jobs differing in degree of difficult...
We propose an assignment model in which positions along a hierarchy are attributed to individuals de...
This paper reviews the literature on two-sided atomeless assign-ment models of workers to tasks. Usi...
Several empirical regularities motivate most theories of the distribution of labor earnings. Earning...
We analyze a model in which workers must be allocated to tasks to produce. There are differences amo...
This paper exploits empirically a key insight from Lucas (1977) and Rosen (1982): that the organizat...
Some pieces of empirical evidence suggest that in the U.S., over the last few decades, (i) wage ineq...
This paper demonstrates the way in which assignment frictions-the limited ability of workers to find...
International audienceWe propose an assignment model in which positions along a hierarchy are attrib...
This paper shows that without substitution of skills and without adjustments of individ ual wages ch...
The distributions of firm size, span of control, and managerial incomes are modeled as the joint out...
[[abstract]]We develop a wage determination model in which a firm decides the pattern of compensatio...
This paper exploits empirically a key insight from Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982): that the organizat...
A central organizing framework of the voluminous recent literature studying changes in the returns t...
Using a simple model with two levels of skill, we assume that high skill workers who fail to get hig...
An ordered-response model for the allocation of individuals to jobs differing in degree of difficult...
We propose an assignment model in which positions along a hierarchy are attributed to individuals de...